I. INTRODUCTION
T his paper examines the role of information reporting (or lack thereof) in explaining individual income tax compliance in the United States by utilizing data on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) examinations of tax returns from the 2001 National Research Program (NRP). These data, observed at the taxpayer level, represent the best administrative data available for such analysis. The NRP is the descendant of the IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, which was last conducted for tax year 1988. In contrast to regular operational IRS audits, taxpayers in the NRP are randomly selected for examination; therefore, the sample is representative of the entire population of U.S. taxpayers. It is no surprise that information reporting "matters" to the extent that its absence facilitates noncompliance; however, the analysis of taxpayer-level microdata allows me to address more directly "how" it matters.
Some of the paper's fndings confrm what we already know, or at least strongly expect. For example, taxpayers are generally compliant in self-reporting matched income (i.e., income subject to information reporting), whereas most taxpayers with unmatched income (i.e., income not subject to information reporting) underreport at least a portion of it. In fact many noncompliant taxpayers underreport precisely 100 percent of unmatched income. Many taxpayers who lack unmatched income would presumably underreport if afforded the opportunity. Similarly, those who possess and underreport 100 percent of unmatched income would presumably underreport more if afforded the opportunity.
Some of the other fndings may be more surprising. For instance, many types of income, especially those types that typically lack information reporting, have the potential to take on negative values; therefore, taxpayers who did not earn unmatched income still have the opportunity to lower their tax liability by claiming income losses. I fnd however that they usually do not. Second, even though many taxpayers underreport 100 percent of unmatched income, the phenomenon is far from universal. In contrast, the classical theory of tax evasion predicts that in the presence of low audit, detection, and penalty rates, virtually all taxpayers with the opportunity to underreport (i.e., taxpayers with unmatched income) should underreport fully. Third, the use of taxpayer-level data reveals that the frequency of 100 percent underreporting varies across taxpayers, though systematically so. Full underreporting is highly prevalent among taxpayers who possess small amounts of unmatched income, whereas most taxpayers with large amounts of unmatched income tend to self-report at least a portion of it.
This differential hints at another of the paper's fndings, namely that unmatched income has heterogeneous effects across taxpayers -a $1 increase in unmatched income will likely increase a low income taxpayer's underreporting by $1 but a high income taxpayer's underreporting by less than $1. Furthermore, I fnd that taxpayers are signifcantly heterogeneous with respect to the threshold amount of income at which they transition from full to partial noncompliance. Using multivariate analyses, I also show that previously observed correlations between income underreporting and variables such as total income and tax rates are largely spurious. These correlations instead appear attributable to two facts. First, higher income taxpayers tend to have more unmatched income. Second, taxpayers with more unmatched income tend to face higher marginal income tax rates due to the progressive income tax schedule as well as the additional self-employment tax levied on much unmatched income.
While the NRP data possess many virtues for studying tax compliance, it is important to note that the NRP examination process (like any other tax return examination) is imperfect -some portion of true noncompliance goes undetected during an examination and does not show up in the data. I discuss the impact of imperfect detection in greater detail in Section III, but in the meantime wish to emphasize a few broad implications. While taxpayers in the NRP are representative of the U.S. population, their measured noncompliance is representative only of that population's noncompliance that would be detectable during an NRP examination. Any empirical results should be interpreted accordingly. The NRP generally underestimates both the frequency and level of underreporting, though this does not diminish my ability to accurately measure many phenomena. For instance, any taxpayer with detected underreporting must have actually underreported. Furthermore, any taxpayer detected to have underreported 100 percent of unmatched income must have in fact done so, even though the data do not necessarily reveal the true level of said unmatched income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on information reporting and tax compliance. Section III defnes the econometric model and describes the 2001 NRP data. Section IV provides summary statistics on unmatched income in the United States. Section V analyzes the determinants of noncompliance occurrences, while Section VI examines underreported income levels. Section VII concludes.
II. LITERATURE ON INFORMATION REPORTING
The classical theory of tax evasion was initiated in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and the Yitzhaki (1974) extension. (Useful surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on tax compliance include Andreoni et al., (1998) , Slemrod (2007) , and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) .) Both papers apply the Becker (1968) economic theory of crime to the specifc context of tax evasion. In this framework, taxpayers inherently wish to avoid all tax liability and are deterred from doing so only by the risk of being caught and penalized. Kleven et al. (2011) presents a parsimonious version of the theory for taxpayers facing non-constant probabilities of audit and detection. The joint probability depends on two factors: (1) the amount of total income that is matched versus unmatched; and (2) the amounts of matched and unmatched income underreported. Audit and detection rates are signifcantly higher when a taxpayer underreports matched income; hence taxpayers are predicted to be wholly compliant in self-reporting matched income. On the other hand, audit and detection rates are low when a taxpayer underreports unmatched income; hence taxpayers are predicted to underreport most (if not all) unmatched income. Kleven et al. (2011, p. 658) note that taxpayers with large amounts of unmatched income may underreport less than 100 percent: "taxpayers who derive most of their income in self-reported form cannot easily evade all their self-reported income." Underlying this argument is the fact that high unmatched income taxpayers face audit and detection rates that generally increase even with marginal increases in noncompliance, not just at the discrete point where the taxpayer has underreported 100 percent of unmatched income and begins underreporting matched income. Phillips (2014) describes the myriad ways in which U.S. audit selection, examination, and penalization processes lead to audit probabilities and payment rates (conditional upon audit) that are endogenous with respect to the amount of underreported income. High unmatched income taxpayers are unable to underreport fully without raising audit and payment rates, and Phillips (2014) also predicts that they will be less willing to do so. The author contends that partial noncompliance is the result of "gamesmanship" rather than "inability" to evade more. Although these taxpayers possess the ability to underreport more unmatched income, they elect not to do so in order that their preferred 1 Alm, Cronshaw, and McKee (1993) test for taxpayer response to a non-random government audit strategy using data from a laboratory experiment. They fnd that audit strategies that depend on taxpayer behavior can generate signifcantly improved compliance. Klepper and Nagin (1989, p. 23) argue that "perceived detection risk and penalties ... are not fxed exogenous quantities but are a function of the level of noncompliance" and tests the statement using 1982 audit data that are aggregated for 11 classes of taxpayers. 2 As with any laboratory experiment, there may be concerns about the representativeness of the test subjects and experimental environment. Levitt and List (2007) discusses such concerns while Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2012) provide evidence in support of at least the qualitative external validity of tax evasion experiments. 3 The "intuitive" sign depends on the choice of dependent and explanatory variables. For instance, more third-party income would be expected to reduce underreported income but increase reported income. More unmatched income would increase underreported income but decrease reported income.
outcomes, either not being audited or facing a low payment rate conditional upon audit, are more likely to occur.
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The theoretical model in Phillips (2014) also provides predictions regarding taxpayer response to changes in income and tax rates. The classical theory of Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that evasion should increase with income and decrease with tax rates so long as taxpayers exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. Phillips shows however that these predictions become ambiguous in the presence of information reporting and endogenous enforcement parameters, though it is worth noting that other theoretical treatments, including those that focus on pro-social and other "behavioral" considerations, lead to similar results. Ambiguous theoretical predictions emphasize the importance of robust empirical estimates of these responses.
Other research has focused specifcally on the role of information reporting in explaining compliance. The laboratory experiment in Alm, Deskins, and McKee (2009) endows test subjects with different amounts of matched and unmatched income and fnds that compliance rates are signifcantly higher for the former. In fact, most empirical studies conducted at the taxpayer level of observation have included some explanatory variable to proxy for unmatched (or matched) income, even if the study was not specifcally focused on information reporting. For instance, the seminal Clotfelter (1983) paper uses fraction of AGI from wages, interest, and dividends (all types of matched income) as a regressor for explaining understated AGI. Feinstein (1991) uses dummy variables for whether unmatched Schedule C (nonfarm sole proprietor income) and Schedule F (farm income) forms were fled. The estimated coeffcients for such variables are typically signifcant and signed according to intuition. However, unmatched income levels are an important determinant of underreported income, a fact best exemplifed by the common occurrence of 100 percent underreporting. In that case unmatched income levels and underreported income levels are identically equal. If unmatched income dummies or fractions are used as regressors, as opposed to the more fundamentally accurate unmatched income level, the coeffcients on other explanatory variables may partially (or perhaps solely) identify a masked effect of correlated unmatched income levels. For example, I show that high-income taxpayers derive a greater fraction of income from unmatched sources. Also, the tax rate measures that are often used as explanatory variables typically gain some variation from the inclusion of self-employment tax among taxpayers with unmatched Schedule C and Schedule F income. 4 Therefore the estimated effects of total income and tax rates on noncompliance levels may confate the true effects with the effect of unmatched income levels.
The paper most directly related to my work is Kleven et al. (2011) , which analyzes the noncompliance of Danish taxpayers. Like this paper, Kleven et al. benefts from the utilization of taxpayer-level examination data on a representative sample of all taxpayers. I will discuss the most relevant Danish results in greater detail in the subsequent analysis in order that I may compare them to the U.S. results. U.S. fndings that mirror those from Denmark lend additional credence to the external validity of the shared fndings. Alternatively, fndings that do not align with those from Denmark provide important insights into the context-specifc intricacies of U.S. taxpayer behavior and tax administration.
Kleven et al. fnd that most taxpayers correctly report matched income, as is the case in the United States. They also fnd that most taxpayers with unmatched income underreport at least a portion of it, and over 60 percent of noncompliant taxpayers underreport 100 percent of unmatched income, whereas the rate of full noncompliance is signifcantly lower in the United States.
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Given the relative infrequency of partial noncompliance in Denmark, the authors focus most attention on the probabilities of any (i.e., greater than 0 percent) and full (i.e., 100 percent) underreporting. Using a multivariate linear probability model, they fnd that unmatched income variables have signifcant effects on the probability of underreporting; furthermore, other socioeconomic variables provide little additional explanatory power.
While there is relatively little attention paid to the absolute levels of underreporting among the partially compliant, the authors fnd that the frequency of full underreporting varies with income, with most "fully" noncompliant taxpayers concentrated among those with less than 20 percent of their total income unmatched. An analogous fnding is attained from the U.S. data, suggesting that the discrepancy in the frequency of full underreporting between the two nations may be attributable not to structural differences in the determinants of taxpayer compliance, but instead to the fact that many more U.S. taxpayers possess large amounts of unmatched income. On balance, the Kleven et al. (2011, p. 676) fndings lead the authors to state that "information, and specifcally the presence and size of income that is diffcult to trace, is the key aspect of the compliance decision," a conclusion that will fnd additional support from the U.S. evidence.
III. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND NRP DATA DESCRIPTION
Consider the following linear model of underreporting for taxpayer i
where the taxpayer's underreported income is E i , some function f (·) of which is determined by factors U i , X i , and e i . In Section V I examine the incidence of underreporting (i.e., f (E i ) is an indicator for non-zero E i ), while in Section VI I examine levels of underreporting (i.e., f (E i ) = E i ). The term U i is a j × 1 explanatory vector, the components of which relate to the amount and types of unmatched income that a taxpayer possesses. The total level of unmatched income is certainly one such component, but I use a vector to denote the relevance of other variables such as an indicator for the possession of unmatched income and indicators for whether that income is positive or negative. The term X i is a k × 1 vector of other observable underreporting determinants like total income, the tax rate, and other socioeconomic characteristics. The scalar e i represents other idiosyncratic and unobservable determinants of the taxpayer's underreporting, where e i is treated as a random variable that is independent across taxpayers and has mean 0. The intercept a , the 1 × j vector β and the 1 × k vector γ are parameters to estimate, with particular attention drawn to β, the effect of the unmatched income vector on underreporting. With this in mind, I now describe the NRP measures of underreporting, unmatched income, and other explanatory variables to be used in the empirical analysis of the model.
Since 1963 the IRS has undertaken several efforts to collect representative data on tax compliance through randomized audit studies. What began in 1963 as the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) was continued in the new century as the National Research Program (NRP).
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The frst NRP study consisted of randomized audits of 44,768 tax year 2001 individual tax returns and is the subject of the empirical analysis in this paper.
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The NRP oversampled high income and Schedule C taxpayers, with 46 percent of the sample having Schedule C income -the corresponding fraction is only 14 percent for the entire population of taxpayers (IRS, 2004) . Slemrod (2007) provides a brief history of IRS compliance measurement. The NRP design allows examiners some discretion as to the type of examination for each reporting component. The TCMP design instead involved "line-by-line audits on all returns in the sample" (Slemrod, 2007, p. 27 ). 7 A second wave of the NRP was performed for tax year 2006. The frst tax gap measures based on this data were released in 2012, but the microdata were unavailable for this research project. Starting with tax year 2006, the IRS has shifted towards conducting more frequent (annual) but smaller (around 14,000 taxpayers per year) NRP studies. 8 The NRP data include population weights that are applied to all subsequent empirical results. 9 The NRP data do not refect noncompliance among non-fling taxpayers. The $236 billion estimate is based on a Detection Controlled Estimation procedure applied to the 2001 NRP data.
The NRP data contain line item values from the tax forms that were submitted by each fler. The data also include the correct line item values that should have been reported, as determined by the IRS. Bloomquist et al. (2013) describe the NRP examination process in some detail, in particular describing the classifcation process by which different tax returns and the line items on said returns are assigned an examination type (e.g., no taxpayer interaction due to the availability of information reporting, a correspondence exam, an offce audit, or a feld audit). Of particular interest, Bloomquist et al. (2013, p. 69) note, "some line items on the return, typically those that could not be verifed through information returns, were always classifed as mandatory to audit." In the event of an IRS correction however, I am unable to observe in the data the mechanism by which the correction occurred. For instance, if the wages line item changes, I cannot infer whether this was because the taxpayer failed to report income that was third-party matched or if the IRS detected wage income that was both unreported and unmatched.
I defne a taxpayer's "true" line item income to be equal to the IRS exam-corrected amount, whereas the taxpayer's line item underreporting is the difference between the IRS exam-corrected amount and the taxpayer's self-reported amount. These defnitions do not account for the fact that the NRP examination process does not uncover all instances and amounts of noncompliance; therefore, both the underreporting measure and actual income measure understate the true amounts. Feinstein (1991) proposes a maximum likelihood procedure that controls for detection, a methodology which is currently employed in IRS estimates of the aggregate tax gap and papers such as Erard and Feinstein (2010) .
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The econometric analysis in this paper does not control for detection and the results should be interpreted accordingly. For instance, later analysis will discuss the determinants of the "incidence of noncompliance," but a more accurate description is the "incidence of detectable noncompliance." The NRP data also cannot distinguish between intentional and unintentional misreporting. I therefore avoid using the word "evasion" in favor of the less loaded terms "noncompliance" and "underreporting," though I recognize that even these terms may carry unintended (at least from my perspective) connotations.
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Subsequent analysis focuses on taxpayers' underreporting of Total Income (TI), which corresponds to line 22 on the 2001 IRS Form 1040. This is the sum of the values entered in the "income" section of the 1040 and equals Adjusted Gross Income plus above-theline deductions. Following previous IRS research, I eliminate 2,462 returns for which the sum of TI components differs from TI by a magnitude greater than $100. For these returns it is unclear whether the sum of line items or the TI line itself best represents self-reported and IRS-determined values. I similarly exclude another 15 returns with missing state data or negative values on line 32 (total adjustments to income) or line 36 (total deduction amount). The source of these omissions is unclear, and there exist concerns about the extent to which the data accurately refect the other variables of interest. I also exclude from the sample those returns with negative TI, negative tax liability, or EITC receipts so that the fnal utilized sample of 34,089 individual tax returns corresponds to taxpayers with a common incentive to underreport components of TI. While phenomena such as the overreporting of income among EITC recipients and the overreporting of deductions are certainly interesting, underreporting of TI was responsible for $165 billion (84 percent) of the $197 billion tax year 2001 individual income tax underreporting tax gap (IRS, 2007) .
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I proxy for an individual's matched and unmatched income using sums of "matchable" and "unmatchable" line items. IRS (2007) distinguishes among four categories of line items when presenting its detection-controlled estimates of net misreporting percentage:
1. Amounts subject to substantial information reporting and withholding: wages and salaries; 2. Amounts subject to substantial information reporting: pensions and annuities, dividend income, interest income, unemployment compensation, and Social Security benefts;
3. Amounts subject to some information reporting: deductions, partnership/SCorporation income, exemptions, capital gains, and alimony income; and 4. Amounts subject to little or no information reporting: nonfarm proprietor income (Schedule C), other income, rents and royalties, farm income (Schedule F), Form 4797 income, and adjustments.
13
I defne the frst two categories as matchable and the latter two as unmatchable.
14 These terms are used in order to articulate the fact that these sums across line items do not perfectly refect income that was matched and unmatched by third-party information reporting. The dichotomous division of line items into two categories is intended to promote a more parsimonious analysis of the data, though it is worth mentioning that there may exist shades of gray between the extremes of "matched" and "unmatched."
With regards to the other determinants of underreporting (i.e., the components of the X i vector), I use marginal tax rates, marital status, age, number of dependents, Census 12 Chetty et al. (2011) examine income tax noncompliance with regards to the EITC. 13 The IRS's detection-controlled estimates of net misreporting percentage for each category are 1.2 percent, 4.5 percent, 8.6 percent, and 53.9 percent, respectively. 14 Per Bloomquist (2003) , capital gains are separated into capital gain distributions and other taxable capital gains using data from Schedule D flings. Capital gain distributions are considered matchable and other taxable capital gains unmatchable. As of tax year 2001, net capital gain distributions were reported on Form 1099-DIV. The gross revenue of other taxable capital transactions were reported to the IRS on Form 1099-B, but this form did not include the asset basis price and therefore no measure of the net gains. Beginning for tax year 2011, Form 1099-B includes both gross proceeds and basis prices for sales of most securities purchased after January 1, 2011.
region, and whether a paid preparer was employed. All of these variables come directly from the NRP data except marginal tax rates. Other feasibly relevant determinants are not available, so the usual caveats about omitted variables apply.
15
The marginal tax rate is calculated as a combination of the federal income, federal self-employment, and state income tax rates. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the tax rate calculations. 16 As noted in Feinstein (1991) , single-year cross-sectional data exhibit high collinearity between income and tax rates due to the progressive income tax schedule. Under my tax rate estimation methodology, much of the remaining variation in tax rates arises from having self-employment-tax-liable Schedule C and Schedule F line items. However, my multivariate analyses will account for both Total Income and the presence of unmatched income, so the remaining variation in tax rates stems largely from variation in state income tax rates.
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Given the limitations of cross-sectional data, multivariate results are provided that both include and omit tax rates as an explanatory variable.
A few other features of the data generating process warrant mention, especially with regard to their impact on the ability to consistently estimate the causal effect of unmatched income on underreporting. First, the amount of unmatched income a taxpayer possesses may not be exogenous to the noncompliance decision. For instance, taxpayers with a higher unobservable "taste" for underreporting may self-select into industries or occupations in which information reporting is less prevalent, or alternatively, have greater incentive to collude with employers to not report income that should in principle be matched. Such observations imply that unmatched income (U i ) may positively correlate with taxpayer unobservables (e i ), leading to upward bias in the estimate of β. Second, a higher e i taxpayer underreports more income, but holding constant true unmatched income, this implies that the taxpayer self-reports less of true income. My (imperfect) measure of unmatched income is the sum of self-reported income and only the detectable portion of unreported income; therefore, a reallocation of income from self-reported to unreported will lower my measure of unmatched income, creating negative correlation between U i and e i , and downward bias in the estimate of β. Finally, detection rates are likely to vary across taxpayers. A relatively high detection rate will increase both a taxpayer's detectable underreporting but also the taxpayer's observed unmatched income, thus leading to additional positive correlation between the dependent and explanatory variables and upward bias in the estimate of β. Plausible biases exist in both directions and intuition alone does not dictate which direction's biases dominate.
There is one noteworthy subset of taxpayers for whom these biases do not matter -taxpayers with a detectable underreporting rate of 100 percent. Among these taxpayers, the econometric "model" of underreporting is trivial: E i = U i , where U i is the taxpayer's unmatched income. The omission of e i is intentional since it is identically equal to the constant 0 for any such taxpayer. Since the covariance of a random variable (i.e., unmatched income) and a constant is 0, endogeneity biases disappear. Furthermore, imperfect detection will equally affect both the left-and right-hand sides of the "model." In this case I will still estimate that a $1 increase in unmatched income increases underreporting by $1. Table 1 shows the fraction of individuals who had a non-zero amount of income for each line item. By far the most common income source is salaries and wages, received by 86 percent of the sample.
IV. INFORMATION REPORTING IN THE UNITED STATES
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The table also aggregates the line items into matchable and unmatchable income. Matchable income line items are the most commonly received, with the fve most common line items (salaries and wages, taxable interest, dividends, state income tax refunds, and taxable pensions and annuities) all matchable. The most commonly received unmatchable sources are taxable net capital gains and losses, received by 21 percent of the population, and Schedule C income, received by 14 percent of the population. Overall, 99 percent of taxpayers have at least one type of matchable income while only 41 percent have some type of unmatchable income. Table 2 shows the contribution of each line item towards aggregate TI. Again, matchable income is much more prevalent, accounting for 84 percent of aggregate TI. Although unmatchable income represents only 16 percent of aggregate TI, it is worth noting that this far exceeds the 5 percent of Danish income that lacks information reporting, as reported in Kleven et al. (2011) . Salaries and wages are by far the largest component (69 percent) of aggregate TI. Taxable interest and dividends are received by 67 percent and 32 percent of taxpayers, respectively, but together account for only 5 percent of aggregate TI. Tables 1 and 2 also show the prevalence and income contributions of line items across TI bins. These results replicate the Johns and Slemrod (2010) analysis of the distribution of unmatched income as measured in the 2001 NRP. Having some matchable income is almost equally likely across TI bins, with likelihoods ranging between 98 and 100 percent. However, the likelihood of having some unmatchable income noticeably increases with TI. Only 25 percent of individuals with TI between $0 and $25,000 have any unmatchable income, while the corresponding fraction for those with TI in excess of $200,000 is 92 percent. The fraction of aggregate TI attributable to unmatchable sources is also strongly increasing in TI. Individuals with less than $100,000 in TI receive more than 90 percent of their income in matchable forms, whereas individuals with more than $200,000 in TI receive 42 percent of TI in unmatchable forms. If the high detectability of matchable income leads to compliance on these line items, it follows that lower income individuals will have relatively little underreporting. Furthermore, Values equal the fraction of taxpayers with non-$0 in detectable income for at least one matchable income line item.
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Values equal the fraction of taxpayers with non-$0 in detectable income for at least one unmatchable income line item. The "alimony received" line item is not shown due to small numbers in the sample but is factored into unmatched income values. Values equal the share of aggregate detectable TI arising from all unmatchable income line items. The "alimony received" line item is not shown due to small numbers in the sample but is factored into unmatchable income values.
if the level of underreporting is increasing in unmatchable income levels, it follows that wealthier taxpayers will underreport greater amounts. Table 3 shows the fraction of taxpayers with underreported, correctly reported, and overreported Total Income.
V. INCIDENCE OF UNDERSTATEMENTS
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The majority of taxpayers (63 percent) reported the correct amount of income, with 33 percent estimated to have underreported and 5 percent to have overreported.
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The rate of underreporting is also increasing in TI, with only 24 percent of taxpayers with TI between $0 and $25,000 underreporting and 46 percent underreporting for TI greater than $200,000.
While high TI taxpayers are more likely to underreport, disaggregation of the data hints that Total Income itself is not driving the result. Columns (2) through (4) of Table  4 present the same statistics as in Table 3 , but separated between those taxpayers with Table 3 also shows the unweighted and weighted shares of the sample for each TI bin. As previously mentioned, the NRP oversampled high income and Schedule C taxpayers. 20 Overreporting of income is likely due to tax preparation errors, but could be strategic for some taxpayers. For instance, taxpayers may believe overreporting will reduce the likelihood of a costly audit. Also, taxpayers may fnd it strategically benefcial to report a correct income receipt but in the wrong year. 
(8) These columns refer to the fraction of taxpayers with detectable misstatements of TI.
3
These columns refer to the fraction of taxpayers with detectable misstatements of matchable income.
4
These columns refer to the fraction of taxpayers with detectable misstatements of unmatchable income.
and without any unmatchable income (panels A and B, respectively). In the aggregate and within all TI bins, taxpayers with unmatchable income are more than twice as likely to have underreported TI. Conditional on whether or not the taxpayer possesses unmatched income, the rate of underreporting no longer increases with income. This preliminary result replicates the Johns and Slemrod (2010) fnding that the higher rate of underreporting among higher income taxpayers is largely attributable to the fact that high income taxpayers are more likely to have unmatchable income. Columns (5) through (7) show the misreporting rates for matchable income line items. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of individuals underreport matchable income regardless of TI bin and regardless of whether they have unmatchable income sources. The non-zero underreporting rate on matchable income likely refects two facts. First, matchable income is an imprecise measure of actually matched income. Second, the Automated Underreporter Program (AUR) results in a high, though not necessarily 100 percent, probability of tax liability reassessment if third-party income is misreported. Taxpayers may therefore believe that small amounts of matched income underreporting will be fagged by AUR but go unpursued by the IRS. The fact that the matchable income underreporting error rates are similar between those with and without unmatchable income is consistent with an assumption that each type of taxpayer has a similar likelihood that some matchable income is not in fact matched. Or alternatively, both types of taxpayers may have common perceptions regarding the IRS's practices regarding matched income noncompliance.
Columns (8) through (10) show the misreporting rates for unmatchable income line items. Unmatchable line items such as Schedule C, Schedule F, and capital losses have the potential to take on negative values and thus provide an opportunity for underreporting even to those individuals who in truth had $0 values. However, approximately 99 percent of those without unmatchable income correctly report values of $0. This fnding can be explained by the fact that the burden of proof is inherently different between misstated positive and negative values. If an individual receives some positive amount of income from one source but reports some lesser, nonnegative amount, he can simply omit the documentation that corresponds to the unreported income. If an individual instead reports some false amount of negative income, he must fabricate documentation that exhibits that the reported losses in fact occurred. Assuming that falsifed documentation is easier to detect and disprove than the omission of correct documentation, noncompliance via overreporting of losses may be unattractive to taxpayers.
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This suggests that the incidence of underreporting might vary not only between taxpayers with and without unmatched income, but also among taxpayers who: (1) have only positive unmatched income receipts; (2) have only negative unmatched income losses; and (3) have both positive and negative unmatched income. Ideally I would disaggregate a taxpayer's net unmatched income into its gross positive and gross negative components, but I observe only the net income at the line item level. For example, someone with Schedule C income might report revenues and expenses but my data only 21 These different forms of misreporting may feasibly lead to different penalties as well.
indicate the resulting net amount. I therefore proxy for whether a taxpayer falls into the categories described above by assigning taxpayers to one of fve types:
• Type 1: Taxpayers with no unmatchable income.
• Type 2: Taxpayers with positive unmatchable income and strictly nonnegative unmatchable income line items.
• Type 3: Taxpayers with negative unmatchable income and strictly nonpositive unmatchable income line items.
• Type 4: Taxpayers with both positive and negative unmatchable income line items, net negative.
• Type 5: Taxpayers with both positive and negative unmatchable income line items, net positive.
Type 2 taxpayers must have gross positive unmatchable income receipts and could feasibly have no gross losses, though I cannot reject the presence of such losses. Type 3 taxpayers must have gross negative unmatchable income losses and could feasibly have no gross gains, though I cannot reject the presence of such gains. Type 4 and 5 taxpayers must have both gross positive and gross negative unmatchable income, but I distinguish between those with net negative (Type 4) and net positive (Type 5) in order to account for possible differences in these taxpayers' perceptions of the tax administration process. Table 5 shows aggregate underreporting rates for these fve types of taxpayers. The results suggest that my proxies are at least partially capturing the differential effects between gross positive and gross negative unmatched income. Those with only negative unmatchable line items (Type 3) have the lowest underreporting rate among the four unmatchable categories, presumably because these taxpayers do not possess (or are less likely to possess) the positive unmatchable income that provides a greater "opportunity" for understatement. The next highest rate is for individuals with both positive and negative unmatchable income line items, but net negative (Type 4). If these individuals perceive that the IRS is more likely to audit them given that even a truthful report would involve negative line items, this would explain the lower prevalence of underreporting relative to Types 2 and 5 which both have net positive unmatchable income and presumably greater amounts of gross positive unmatchable income. Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate linear probability analysis of understatements.
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The dependent variable is 1 if an understatement occurred and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) present the results when only "socioeconomic" characteristics are included as explanatory variables and unmatchable income variables are omitted. Socioeconomic variables considered are the natural log of Total Income, the tax rate, an indicator for being married, an indicator for whether a paid-preparer was employed, and indicators for age bins, number of dependents, and Census Division.
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I sequentially report the results of different model specifcations in order to demonstrate how the "effects" of variables like total income and tax rates may be spurious.
Consistent with the aggregate results from Table 3 , TI has a signifcant, positive correlation with underreporting incidence when tax rates are omitted, but the effect reverses sign (and remains statistically signifcant) when tax rates are included. The reversal of sign in column (2) suggests that aggregate statistics on underreporting frequencies will in fact reveal a positive correlation with income, but that this aggregate correlation is spurious and (more than) attributable to correlation between total income and other relevant determinants like tax rates and, as shown in later columns, unmatchable income. Tax rates are estimated to have a large, positive, and signifcant effect on underreporting incidence.
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Column (3) shows the results when only unmatchable income variables are employed as explanatory variables. Note that only the log of the sum of positive unmatchable income line items is employed as an explanatory variable since positive unmatchable income provides a distinctly different opportunity for underreporting.
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Indicator variables for the four types of taxpayers with unmatchable income are also used. For taxpayers who already possess some positive unmatchable income, a 1 percent increase in such income increases the likelihood of understatement by 0.0335 percentage points. This marginal effect is quantitatively swamped by the discrete change in probability that occurs when taxpayers go from having zero to some non-zero amount of unmatchable income. Each of the four types of taxpayers with unmatchable income (positive or negative) is more likely to underreport TI than a taxpayer without unmatchable income. Types 2, 4, and 5 (i.e., those taxpayers with some positive unmatchable income line items) are all 4 to 6 percentage points more likely to underreport once they receive any unmatchable income, while Type 3 is nearly 16 percentage points more likely. 27 However, Type 23 The distinction between "socioeconomic" and unmatchable income variables is taken from Kleven et al. (2011) and allows comparison to those results. However, I include income and tax rates in the "socioeconomic" variable category since theoretical models predict they are relevant determinants of underreporting even in the absence of a non-constant audit probability function and no distinction between matched and unmatched income. 24 The estimated coeffcient on tax rate in column (2) implausibly exceeds one, a result that attains from the use of a linear probability model. The estimated effect from a probit model is also quite large but the estimated marginal effect is less than one. I stress that column (2)'s specifcation is inaccurate as it omits unmatched income variables. The results from column (2) are only relevant as a comparison against the correctly specifed column (5) Kleven et al. (2011). 28 Column (4) reports the results when socioeconomic variables (excluding tax rates) and unmatchable income variables are simultaneously included. The effect of ln(Total Income) on noncompliance is not signifcantly different from 0, verifying the observation from Table 4 that higher underreporting incidence among the wealthy spuriously arises from the correlation of total income and unmatchable income. Also, the inclusion of socioeconomic variables in column (4) offers little additional explanatory power relative to the column (3) regression that only uses unmatchable income variables (R 2 =0.119 versus R 2 =0.114). Column (5) includes both ln(Total Income) and tax rates as explanatory variables, along with unmatchable income variables. The effects of Total Income and tax rates are both signifcantly different from 0, though the magnitudes are greatly reduced from the estimates in column (2). The effect of Total Income in column (5) is only half of that in column (2), and the effect of tax rates is only a quarter. On the other hand, the coeffcients on the unmatchable income variables are signifcantly positive and similar to the estimates from column (3). Furthermore, the R 2 value in column (5) is similar to that in column (3) (R 2 =0.120 versus R 2 =0.114), implying that the addition of these socioeconomic variables offers little additional explanatory power.
Although the coeffcients on income and tax rates are statistically signifcant, they have small quantitative impact relative to unmatched income. For instance, consider an individual with $25,000 in matched income. Using the estimates from column (5) and holding all else equal, a doubling of matched income to $50,000 is predicted to decrease the likelihood of underreporting by just 1.3 percentage points. If the taxpayer's tax rate dramatically doubles from 20 percent to 40 percent, he is 5.6 percentage points more likely to underreport. These changes are minimal compared to a counterfactual in which the taxpayer has just $1,000 of $25,000 in total income reallocated from matchable to unmatchable. In this case the likelihood of underreporting increases by 27.7 percentage points.
These NRP-based results indicate that the Kleven et al. (2011, p. 676) fnding that "information, and specifcally the presence and size of income that is diffcult to trace, is the key aspect of the compliance decision" generalizes to the United States. However, it is also worth noting that many U.S. taxpayers with the "ability" to underreport do not do so. For instance, 46 percent of Type 2 taxpayers and 39 percent of Schedule C 28 The small increase in R 2 between columns (1) and (2) (0.025 to 0.049) likely refects some of the explanatory power of unmatchable income. This is because some of the variation in tax rates arises from individuals with unmatchable Schedule C and Schedule F income being subject to self-employment tax.
taxpayers do not underreport. 29 Therefore, notions of both "willingness" and "ability" to be noncompliant appear necessary to explain the occurrence of noncompliance in the United States. Table 7 shows sample averages of the magnitude of misstatement amounts across TI bins. Column (3) provides the average understatement (conditional on having made an understatement) and column (4) the average overstatement (conditional on having made an overstatement). Column (5) gives the net average understatement, combining understatements (positive contribution to the average), overstatements (negative contribution to the average), and correct statements (zero contribution to the average). An average overreporting taxpayer overstates TI by approximately $2,600, while an average underreporting taxpayer understates TI by $6,100. For any given TI bin, average understatements are also far greater than average overstatements. The relatively constant values of average overstatements across TI bins lend credence to the hypothesis that these reports occur due to error. However, while some underreports certainly occur due to error, the signifcantly greater prevalence and magnitude of understatements suggests that intent (as opposed to error) is the dominant determinant of observed understatements. Table 7 also shows that conditional on a TI understatement, the amount of TI underreporting is increasing in income. The average understatement ranges from less than $3,000 for an individual with TI between $0 and $25,000, to $40,000 for an individual with TI greater than $200,000. Column (6) however shows that the average understatement, expressed as fraction of TI, is constant at around 8 or 10 percent for taxpayers with TI above $25,000.
VI. UNDERSTATEMENT LEVELS
Disaggregating taxpayers into those with and without unmatchable income again reveals that the correlation between underreporting levels and TI may be spurious. Table 8 shows that underreporters with unmatchable income (Panel A) underreport signifcantly greater amounts of TI (both in terms of levels of underreporting and fraction of TI underreported) relative to taxpayers without any unmatchable income (Panel B). In fact, the average portion of TI understated for those with unmatchable income is between three and eight times as large as the average understatement for those in the same TI bin without unmatchable income. Table 9 presents the results of a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of unmatchable income understatement amounts. Theory dictates that the true determinant of noncompliance is not total unmatched income, but rather, gross positive unmatched income. For example, one might predict that a taxpayer with both gross positive and gross negative unmatched income would underreport 100 percent of the former and 0 percent 29 More precisely, 46 percent of Type 2 taxpayers were not detected to have underreported, so 46 percent is necessarily an overestimate of the actual fraction that did not underreport. However, it is surely the case that the actual incidence of correct reports is greater than 0 percent. The same comment applies to Schedule C taxpayers.
Table 7
Magnitude of Detectable Total Income Misstatements Raw NRP data provide income as detected by NRP auditors and does not include unreported income that went undetected.
2 This is the average detectable TI for all taxpayers and is not conditional on any type of misstatement.
3 These values are conditioned on having a detectable understatement or overstatement.
4
These values are not conditioned on having a detectable misstatement. 
A. In this analysis the dependent variable is underreported Total Income. As in the previous multivariate analysis of understatement incidence, explanatory variables are divided into "socioeconomic" and "unmatchable income" categories. I again report the results of different empirical specifcations sequentially in order to demonstrate how the "effects" of variables like total income and tax rates may be spurious. The unmatchable income explanatory variables include a spline on positive unmatchable income. A spline is imposed in order to allow the functional freedom necessary so that taxpayers' responses to a marginal dollar of unmatchable income may vary depending on total unmatchable income. For instance, a taxpayer who goes from having $10 to $11 of true unmatched income may very well increase underreporting by $1. A taxpayer who instead goes from $50,000 to $50,001 of true unmatched income may increase underreporting by less than $1.
Columns (1) and (2) present the results when only "socioeconomic" characteristics are included as explanatory variables and unmatchable income variables are omitted. Only TI has a signifcant, positive effect on underreporting, though the point estimate is small: for every additional dollar of TI, taxpayers are estimated to underreport only about 10 more cents. Though statistically insignifcant, a 1 percent increase in the tax rate corresponds to an increase in TI underreporting of $220.
Column (3) reports the regression results when only unmatchable income variables are included as explanatory variables. The estimated coeffcients are generally large and statistically signifcant. The average taxpayer is estimated to underreport fully 98 cents of every additional dollar of unmatchable income below $1,000. The estimated responses are smaller when evaluated at larger amounts of unmatchable income, with the estimated coeffcient going to down to 0.103 when unmatchable income exceeds $100,000. However, taxpayers with unmatchable income between $50,000 and $100,000 are estimated to underreport on average 62 cents of every additional dollar of unmatchable income received.
When both socioeconomic and information variables are included in the regressions, the qualitative results are similar to those encountered in the analysis of incidence. The effect of TI on TI underreporting amounts is not statistically different from zero, confrming the observation from Tables 7 and 8 that the correlation between TI and underreporting is spurious. The coeffcient on tax rates remains statistically insignifcant. Relative to column (2), the tax rate coeffcient both switches sign and shrinks in magnitude. This indicates that the column (2) coeffcient largely refects the correlation between unmatchable income levels and income and self-employment tax rates. On the other hand, the coeffcients on unmatchable income variables are largely unchanged Although these regression results are informative, they provide an incomplete picture of the importance of unmatched income. In particular, the regression analysis averages across all taxpayers and does not provide any information about potentially heterogeneous underreporting behavior. Figure 1 shows the distribution of underreporting rates for Type 2 taxpayers with only positive unmatchable income line items. In this fgure, the "underreporting rate" is defned as the fraction of positive unmatchable income that is underreported. Complete underreporting of positive unmatchable income is in fact a common occurrence, with 25 percent of underreporters having an underreporting rate between 95 percent and 105 percent. In fact, 25 percent is an underestimate of the true frequency of complete underreporting as it does not account for instances in which true unmatchable income was entirely unreported and undetectable. Furthermore, another 15 percent of taxpayers have underreporting in excess of 105 percent. Even though these taxpayers realized unmatchable income gains, they reported losses. 31 However, full underreporting is far from universal. In stark contrast to the Danish taxpayers studied by Kleven et al. (2011) , nearly 60 percent of underreporting U.S. taxpayers report at least a portion of unmatchable income.
A closer examination of the NRP data reveals the source of this discrepancy. Figure  2 shows the relative frequency of full underreporting, partial underreporting, and correct reporting across bins of taxpayers' positive unmatchable income, where I consider underreporting below 5 percent to be approximately "correct." The fraction of taxpayers that underreport in excess of 5 percent changes little across income levels; however, the fraction of taxpayers that underreport around 100 percent is clearly decreasing in total income. For example, 84 percent of underreporting taxpayers with ln[Positive Unmatchable Income] less than 7 (i.e., unmatchable income less than $1,096) underreport 95 percent or more of total positive unmatchable income. The comparable rate is only 54 percent for those with ln[Positive Unmatchable Income] greater than 7, and only 26 percent for those with ln[Positive Unmatchable Income] greater than 10 (i.e., unmatchable income greater than $22,026). These results suggest that the discrepancy in the frequency of full underreporting between the United States and Denmark arises largely from the fact that many more U.S. taxpayers receive large amounts of income in unmatched forms. Even in Denmark, high unmatched income taxpayers tend to be partially compliant (see Kleven et al. (2011) , Figure 3B , p. 672) -there are simply fewer such taxpayers in Denmark than in the United States. 31 These taxpayers could feasibly be underreporting 100 percent or some amount less than 100 percent of gross positive unmatched income. The unmatchable income measure is based on line item totals. For some taxpayers, these line item totals may net out both positive and negative within-line-item amounts.
Figure 1
Distribution [5.5,6) [6,6.5) [6.5,7) [7,7.5) [7.5,8) [8,8.5) [8.5,9) [9,9.5) [9.5,10) [10,10.5) [10.5,11) [11,11.5) [11.5,12) ln [Positive Unmatchable Income] P e r c e n t <5% Underreporters 5%-95% Underreporters 95%-105% Underreporters >105% Underreporters Figure 3 plots the predicted underreporting of unmatchable income for Type 2 taxpayers with strictly positive unmatchable income. These plots are estimated by regressing underreported unmatchable income on a positive unmatchable income spline. The thick dashed line is estimated using OLS and shows the estimated underreporting behavior for the average underreporting taxpayer.
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The average taxpayer actually underreports more than 100 percent of unmatchable income until true unmatchable income exceeds $2,800. The average underreporting taxpayer with $100,000 of positive unmatchable income is estimated to underreport $46,300, or alternatively, to self-report only $53,700.
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Figure 3 also plots predicted underreporting for a broad range of quantiles of underreporting taxpayers using quantile regressions. Plotting the underreporting of different quantiles helps illuminate the tremendous heterogeneity in noncompliance across taxpayers. In particular, the "average" across taxpayers (as refected in the OLS line) confates two distinctly different underreporting outcomes -taxpayers who are fully noncompliant and those who are partially compliant. The 45-degree line in the Figure  corresponds to taxpayers who underreport all of their unmatchable income. In fact, for taxpayers with less than $1,000 of unmatchable income, the 30 The quantile regressions also illuminate how individual taxpayers vary in their responses to marginal increases in unmatched income. As taxpayers receive additional unmatchable income, those who were initially underreporting 100 percent of unmatchable income eventually escape the "gravity" of full underreporting and begin to partially report additional unmatchable income. For instance, the 30 th and 40 th quantiles begin reporting some unmatchable income once unmatchable income exceeds $1,000. The median taxpayer begins reporting some unmatchable income once true unmatchable income exceeds $2,500. On the other side of the 45-degree line, taxpayers who originally underreported in excess of 100 percent eventually have enough unmatchable income that they are drawn in to the "gravity" of 100 percent underreporting. For instance, the 80 th quantile taxpayer underreports more than 100 percent when unmatchable income is less than $2,500, underreports precisely 100 percent when unmatchable income falls between $2,500 and $10,000, and then starts partially reporting additional unmatchable income. The 90 th quantile taxpayer only begins underreporting 100 percent once unmatchable income exceeds $10,000, continues to do so until unmatchable 32 The OLS line corresponds to Column (3) of Table 9 . 33 IRS (2007) estimates an 8.6 percent net misreporting percentage on "items subject to some information reporting" and 53.9 percent on "items subject to little or no information reporting." IRS net misreporting percentages employ a detection-controlled methodology to account for income that went undetected by NRP auditors. The current analysis only accounts for that income that was detectable to the NRP auditors. 34 I presume that the lower quantiles of taxpayers, in particular those in the 20 th and lower quantiles who are partially compliant, disproportionately include taxpayers who had no intent to misreport. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Using U.S. taxpayer-level data from the 2001 NRP, this paper has shown that the presence and amount of unmatched income are the primary determinants of income tax noncompliance. Taxpayers are largely compliant in self-reporting matched income, while taxpayers with unmatched income often underreport. Those taxpayers who underreport unmatched income tend to have higher total incomes and also face higher tax rates; consequently, correlations between underreporting and total income, and underreporting and tax rates, are largely spurious. These results support the external validity of the infuential Kleven et al. (2011) study of Danish compliance. Unlike Denmark however, many fewer U.S. taxpayers underreport 100 percent of unmatched income. This discrepancy is largely explained by the observation that high income taxpayers in both countries tend to be partially compliant, but more U.S. taxpayers receive large amounts of unmatchable income.
Unfortunately observational audit data cannot necessarily identify the precise mechanism that induces this partial underreporting. To the extent that strictly positive understated income refects intent, these taxpayers are "willing" to be noncompliant. The partially compliant are also "able" to underreport more than they do. Even though a marginal increase in underreporting may increase audit and penalty rates for the partially noncompliant, these increases will certainly be smaller than those that occur when a taxpayer has exhausted unmatched income and begins to underreport matched income. These comments hint at the value of future research that focuses on the underlying determinants of partial noncompliance. This avenue of inquiry would prove policy relevant, especially in the United States where partially compliant taxpayers are highly prevalent and underreport large amounts of income on a per capita basis.
Finally the results in this paper inform considerations of an interesting policy counterfactual, namely one in which previously unmatched income becomes subject to third-party information reporting. The NRP results show that the associated effects on compliance will vary signifcantly depending on whether the recipient of the income is wholly or partially noncompliant. For instance, most taxpayers with low unmatched income fully underreport unmatched income; therefore, reallocating $1 of income from unmatched to matched will increase self-reported income by $1. However, most taxpayers with high unmatched income underreport less than 100 percent of unmatched income. Among these taxpayers, reallocating $1 from unmatched to matched may very well increase self-reported income by less than $1. A complete analysis of the costs and benefts of additional information reporting requirements will necessarily need to account for these heterogeneous effects on self-reported tax liabilities. 35 Specifcally, a 90 th quantile taxpayer with $100,000 of unmatchable income underreports $94,420 and is estimated to underreport an additional $0.866 for every marginal dollar of unmatchable income in excess of $100,000. The marginal effect is not signifcantly different from one.
